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    The relation of corporate governance (CG) and firm performance, where performance is 
interpreted broadly to include not only economic profits but also best management practices, is a 
central issue confronting CG scholars. In particular, the structure and effectiveness of corporate 
boards continues to draw intense scrutiny, in part because of the tension between their legal role and 
their actual performance. In most countries, the boards of directors serve as the legal representatives 
of and have the fiduciary responsibility to monitor management and serve the interests of 
shareholders (e.g., Black, 2000; Van Den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Meanwhile, board 
responsibility is generally interpreted to include not only the monitoring role of boards but also the 
expectation that boards will provide knowledge, advice, and business networks to aid management 
in improving firm performance (Harris and Raviv, 2008; Pugliese et al., 2009; Zahra and Pearce, 
1989), and will effectively represent shareholders in designing management compensation (Kumar 
and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). However, following a wave of high profile corporate scandals 
globally in the last two decades, the determinants of firm performance and the role of boards and 
national governance characteristics remain intense areas of CG research.   
In this issue, we have contributions that address various aspects of these issues both at the 
level of the firm and at the level of national governance characteristics.  The first paper, by Mather 
et al., examines the relation of director characteristics, such as reputation and financial expertise, to 
the quality of managerial earnings forecasts (MEFs).  Higher quality MEFs, for example those that 
are more accurate and specific or are less contaminated with bias, clearly improve transparency and 
reduce agency costs, i.e., are consistent with notions of best management practices or superior firm 
performance. Using some unique aspects of Australian securities laws that mandate “continuous” 
disclosure of price-sensitive information, the paper examines the association between board 
characteristics and the quality of MEFs. They find that the relation of positive board characteristics, 
such as independence, good reputation, and financial expertise, to higher quality MEFs is 
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moderated by the growth opportunities available to the firm. Previous research on this topic had 
been unable to find a clear and positive association between board independence and higher quality 
MEFs; indeed, some studies found a negative association between superior board characteristics 
and MEF quality. However, the significant innovation in the study by Mather et al. is that it 
examines the influence of firms’ investment opportunities on the incentives of the board. It is a 
common assumption in the agency literature that firms with higher growth options are more subject 
to agency costs from adverse selection and moral hazard. The authors hypothesize that independent, 
reputable, and expert directors will recognize the higher value of information transparency in high 
growth option firms, and will therefore be more diligent in mitigating the agency costs by ensuring 
the quality of MEFs. An analysis of archival data supports their hypothesis. This significance of this 
study is that it shows clearly the importance of considering the incentives of the board and how 
these are related to other non-governance related characteristics.  
In a related vein, the second paper by Farrell et al. examines the influence of both 
governance and non-governance related firm-level characteristics on decisions by management to 
strategically “manage earnings” through share repurchases. In contrast to high quality MEFs, these 
earnings management related activities obfuscate the true economic picture of the firm and increase 
asymmetric information. Using a large sample of 2,225 (unique) U.S. firms suspected of earnings 
management over a ten-year period from 1997 to 2006, these authors find that growth firms are less 
likely to use share repurchases for earnings management purposes. The hypothesis here is that 
growth firms have better investment opportunities and, therefore, lower amounts of excess cash 
available for use in strategic earnings management activities. Moreover, because the firm’s board 
must approve share repurchase programs, the quality of corporate governance is implicated in the 
propensity to engage in earnings management, other things held fixed. The study finds that firms 
with a more independent board, a separation of the roles of CEO and chairman of the board, higher 
CEO ownership or a low entrenchment index (E-Index) are less likely to engage in earnings 
management. Here again we see that while many conventional CG measures come into play in 
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affecting firm performance, the effects of those variables is modified by the quality of investment 
opportunities available to the firm.   
The third paper, by Rost and Weibel, revisits the determination of CEO executive 
compensation, which has been a subject of a very large literature, from a fresh and especially 
interesting perspective.  They argue that current executive compensation practices can be viewed as 
infringing the basic social norm that compensation should be fair. There has been a worldwide 
explosion in CEO compensation in the last two or three decades (Walsh, 2008). For example, CEOs 
in many large public companies now earn more than 500 times the salary of the lowest paid 
employee in the firm. A major factor in the growing disparity of executive and no-executive 
compensation has been the increasing use of stock options in executive compensation, and in most 
firms only a small proportion of employees have access to such options (Frydman and Saks, 2010). 
While these compensation trends have been evaluated in the literature from a variety of perspectives 
(Weisbach, 2007), the role of “subjective, judgmental and socially interactive processes” (O’Neill, 
1999) in executive compensation has received little attention. The study by Rost and Weibel makes 
an important contribution by developing the relation of social norms to compensation, and then 
using a vignette-survey with a representative sample of Swiss citizens to document several novel 
results. The authors develop a model to “adapt and contextualize” social norm theory to the CEO 
compensation context. The model clarifies how individual differences, for example relating to status 
attributes and moral development, underlie differing perceptions of “norm-infringement,” and how 
these, in turn, lead to the propensity to punish firms with norm-infringing CEO pay practices. Their 
data support the model. In particular, individuals with low-status attributes and individuals with 
highly developed moral views are more likely to be resentful of unequal pay practices and, 
importantly, are willing to punish norm-infringing compensation practices, especially in the 
presence of low-cost protest actions. However, individuals with sufficiently high feelings of 
deprivation are willing to consider punishing norm-infringement even if the protest actions impose 
high individual costs. This study introduces, in useful and illuminating way, an important 
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dimension in the executive compensation debate that has heretofore been missing in the literature. It 
will be fascinating to see how further research builds on this study to develop the important 
interaction between CG and social norms.   
 As noted by Adams et al. (2010), there are two fundamental issues relating to boards: First, 
what are the determinants of the structure or composition of boards? Second, what are the 
determinants of board performance (or actions)? The fourth paper, by Sur et al., tackles the first 
issue; they examine the relation of ownership structure, specifically the distribution of different 
types of investors or shareholders, to board composition. This is a novel perspective because the 
previous literature has largely analyzed the determinants of board composition (e.g., insider versus 
independent) based on characteristics specific to the CEO, or the directors, or the firm. That 
owners’ preferences or types (e.g., institutional versus family-owned) would also play a role is 
intuitively plausible, but has been rarely explored in the literature. Using archival data for U.S. 
firms, the study finds that there is relation of board composition (that is, insider, affiliated, or 
independent) with the ownership configuration (institutional, corporate parent, family-entrepreneur 
control), even after controlling for the covariates considered in the earlier literature. Clearly, the 
different owner types have distinct concerns and expectations from the board, based on their 
specific objectives and constraints. For example, institutional investors are focused on abnormal 
returns, relative to the systematic risk of the firm, because mutual and pension fund managers (for 
example) are compensated based on market benchmarks. On the other hand, family-owned or 
corporate owners may look to the directors for expertise and other resources for the firm. Thus, a 
contribution of the paper is to show that board composition and structure cannot be understood from 
any single theoretical lens; rather, the heterogeneity in ownership preferences requires multiple 
theoretical lenses: for example, both an agency-theoretic view and a resource-dependency 
perspective. Moreover, the paper is novel in emphasizing that boards and outside investors may be 
complementary with respect to corporate governance, in contrast to the substitutability between 
owner and board monitoring that is emphasized in the literature. Indeed, the results of this study 
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appear closely linked to the “clientele” approach to tax and payout policies recently emphasized in 
the finance literature (Baker and Wurgler, 2004). There the idea is that firms tailor their financial 
policies to match the preferences of their dominant owner-types. Similarly, the Sur et al. study 
seems to suggest a clientele approach to board structure that could be potentially quite fruitful. 
While the first four papers take a firm-level perspective, the fifth paper, by Aguilera et al., 
explores the interaction between firm- and national-level governance characteristics in 
understanding the relation of CG to firm performance. Though a creative use of fuzzy set (or 
qualitative comparative analysis), the study demonstrates the heterogeneity in the bundles of 
corporate governance practices that generate high firm performance. One of the most powerful 
insights of the study is that individual CG practices within a bundle need not be related to each 
other in a monotonic fashion, nor is there necessarily a substitutability relationship between 
corporate governance practices from the viewpoint of generating high firm performance. Indeed, at 
the level of the firm, there is a rich variety of functionally equivalent governance “paths” to higher 
performance. This substantially expands the scope of effective governance mechanisms available to 
firms, and cautions policy makers at the national level against forcing simple and homogenous 
governance mechanisms on firms. Moreover, this view suggests that firms should carefully examine 
the complementarity, as much as the substitutability, among various practices in designing their CG 
mechanisms.   
We hope that the papers in this issue will provide impetus to move CG research forward in 
some important dimensions. The theoretical CG literature still largely either views the board as a 
selfless and perfect agent of shareholders or as co-opted by the CEO (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). 
Much work remains to be done to construct theoretical models of board behavior and incentives that 
take into account the imperatives of individual directors (Cyert et al., 2002; Huse et al., 2011). The 
empirical findings presented in this issue, such as those in the studies by Mather et al., Farrell et al., 
and Sur et al., should provide a rich resource for theorists to develop models that incorporate some 
salient aspects of firms and their ownership structures that influence board structure and behavior. 
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Such models will help generate other refutable predictions that refine and deepen our understanding 
of the fundamental issues regarding boards that are raised, for example, by Adams et al. (2010). 
Similarly, the role of social norms in the determination of executive compensation is plausible 
intuitively, and the paper by Rost and Weibel does a very nice job of providing empirical support. 
This study should help motivate refinement and extension of existing theoretical frameworks for the 
determination of executive compensation and lead to better empirical design on this issue; for 
example, empirical researchers need to develop strategies to address the potential bias from 
excluding social norm based variables from the empirical specifications regarding managerial 
compensation. Finally, the study by Aguilera et al. breaks new ground in the application of 
qualitative comparative analysis for understanding the design of both firm- and national-level 
governance mechanisms for high firm performance. 
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